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SCOPE OF CITY HOME RULE IN NEW YORK: REVISING WARD
BOUNDARIES FOR ELECTION OF SUPERVISORS SERVING ON
COUNTY BOARD

By EmIL L. COHEN

AND JACOB

D. HmAN*

A

T THE general election held on November 3, 1959, a tie resulted in
connection with the election of Supervisors to serve on the traditionally
Republican Erie County Board of Supervisors. Twenty-seven Republican
candidates were elected and twenty-seven Democratic- candidates were elected. 1
This result followed changes made in the ward boundaries within the City
of Buffalo early in the year, which were challenged in the Courts, the Court
of Appeals upholding the changes. An analysis of the results demonstrated
that if the voting had proceeded along the old boundary lines, the line-up
of the Board of Supervisors would have been a Republican majority of twentynine to twenty-five rather than a tie.2 It is thus apparent that the change
of ward boundaries and the challenge thereto are of more than academic
interest. Further, they portend possible future action along similar lines.
This analysis of the background and issues involved in the litigation is
written by authors who are of opposite political affiliations and one of whom
was an advocate in the litigation. Nevertheless, as will appear, the authors are
in agreement in large measure. Wherever they are in major disagreement,
that fact will be indicated and the reader will be left to make his own
evaluation of the validity of the respective positions taken.
Composition of the Erie County Board of Supervisors and History
of the Wards in Buffalo
Each of the twenty-five towns in the County of Erie has one supervisor. 3
The cities of Lackawanna and Tonawanda each have one supervisor under
the charters adopted by the state legislature for their government. 4 Since
1914, one supervisor has been elected from each of twenty-seven wards in
the City of Buffalo. In that year a new charter provided for the City by the
state legislature divided the City into twenty-seven wards, defining the boundaries of each, and provided for the election of a supervisor from each ward to
serve on the Board of Supervisors of Erie County. 5 Accordingly, the Erie
County Board of Supervisors is composed of fifty-four supervisors, twentyfive selected from the towns, one from the City of Lackawanna, one from
the City of Tonawanda, and twenty-seven from the City of Buffalo.
Some of the ward boundaries were altered by legislative amendment of
*Emil L. Cohen, a member of the Erie County Bar, was attorney for the plaintiff
and petitioner in the litigation attacking the local laws here discussed. Jacob D. Hyman
is Dean of the University of Buffalo School of Law. 1. Buffalo Evening News, Nov. 4, 1959, p. 1.
2. Buffalo Evening News, Nov. 5, 1959, p. 35, cols. 6, 7.

3. N.Y. TowN LAW §§ 29, 41.
4.

N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1911 ch. 524; N.Y. SFss. LAWS 1911 ch. 535.

5. N.Y. Sa.ss. LAWS 1914 ch. 217.
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the charter in 1917. 6 In 1927, the City of Buffalo altered the ward boundaries
in its charter by local law.7 In the same year a new charter for the City of
Buffalo, prepared by a charter commission and approved by the voters at a
special election on August 29, 1927, was enacted, providing for nine councilmanic districts, consisting of three wards each, but maintaining the existing
ward boundaries.8 In 1935 and 1943, the legislature added certain territory
to the City of Buffalo and provided that it should form part of specified wards. 9
In 1944 the City of Buffalo made some minor changes in the boundaries of
some of the wards in order to conform to newly drawn Senate and Assembly
district lines. 10 In 1948, the City of Buffalo re-enacted the charter provisions
defining ward boundaries, without making any changes, in order to incorporate
changes theretofore made." And in 1954 the City made minor changes in
the boundaries of two wards in order to conform to changes in Assembly
district lines.' 2
History of the Litigation
On January 3, 1959, the Mayor of the City of Buffalo approved a local
law passed by the Common Council 13 which altered the boundaries of twentysix of the twenty-seven wards of the City. An action was thereupon commenced
for declaratory judgment concerning the effect of the local law upon the nomination and election of Supervisors to serve upon the Erie County Board of
Supervisors. The primary contention, and the one to be discussed herein, was
that the City lacked the power to affect the position of City Supervisors elected
to serve on the Board of Supervisors of Erie County under the City Home Rule
Provisions of the Constitution of the State of New York and under the City
4
Home Rule Law.'
It was also contended in the third cause of action that in any event
under the City Home Rule Law, the local law was subject to mandatory
referendum in that it changed the "method of nominating (or) electing ...
an elective officer."
Special Term upheld the contention that under the provisions of the
Constitution and the City Home Rule Law, the City was without power to
alter ward boundaries so as to affect the position of Supervisors to serve on
the Board of Supervisors of Erie County. It further held that, in any event,
6.
7.
8.

N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1917 ch. 704.
Burr A o, N.Y., LAWS 1927, No. 1.
BuEALo, N.Y., LAws 1932, No. 4.

9. N.Y. Sass.
10. BuAxo,
11. Bu=Ao,
12. BuF A.o,
13.

LAws 1935,
N.Y., LAws
N.Y., LAWS
N.Y., LAWS

ch. 829, 830, 831; N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1943, ch. 613.
1944, No. 3. Record on Appeal, D. Fol. 79, infra note 42.
1948, No. 4.
1954, No. 4. Record, D. Fol. 82 inra note 42.

BuriAsxo, N.Y., LAws 1959, No. 1.

14. It was contended in a separate cause of action in the action for declaratory
judgment that the Local Law was unreasonable. Special Term ruled that this was not
a proper subject of inquiry, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to rule upon this question, and the Court of Appeals upheld the Special Term
in this regard. The limitations of this article do not permit a discussion of this aspect
of the litigation.
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the Local Law was subject to mandatory referendum as changing the method
of nominating or electing an elective officer.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department, by
a vote of four to one, upheld the Special Term.
The Court of Appeals, by a vote of six to one, reversed, and held that
the City of Buffalo did have the power under the Constitution and City Home
Rule Law to make the changes in the ward boundaries so as to affect the
nomination and election of Supervisors, and that the Local Law was not subject
to mandatory referendum. 15
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
In the main, the Court of Appeals dealt with the following Home Rule
provision of the Constitution (Article IX, Section 12):
Every city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws
not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the state relating
to its property, affairs or government. Every city shall also have
the power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with this
constitution and laws of the state, and whether or not such local laws
relate to its property, affairs or government, in respect to the
following subjects: the powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode
of selection and removal, terms of office and compensation of all its
officers and employees except of members of the governing elective
body of the county in which such city is wholly contained, the membership and constitution of its local legislative body, the transaction
of its business, the incurring of its obligations, the presentation,
ascertainment and discharge of claims against it, the acquisition,
care, management and use of its streets and property, the ownership
and operation of its transit facilities, the collection and administration
of local taxes authorized by the legislature, the wages or salaries, the
hours of work or labor, and the protection, welfare and safety of persons employed by any contractor or subcontractor performing work,
labor or services for it, the government and regulation of the conduct
of its inhabitants and the protection of their property, safety and
health.
Every city may repeal, supersede or modify any law which was
enacted upon and which required, pursuant to the constitution, a
message from the governor declaring that an emergency existed and
the concurrent action of two-thirds of the members of each house of
the legislature, insofar as such law relates to the property, affairs or
government of such city, except ....
15. In the companion case, Grimm v. City of Buffalo, involving the changes in
the councilmanic districts, there was no challenge to the power to alter ward and
coundilmanic district boundaries insofar as they related to the nomination and election
of city councilmen. It was urged that a referendum was required under Section 15(4)
of the City Home Rule Law which makes a referendum mandatory whenever there
is a change in the "method of nominating [or] electing . . . an elective officer." This
contention, which was upheld at Special Term and by the Appellate Division, was overruled by the Court of Appeals.
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The conclusions of the Court of Appeals in this connection may be summarized as follows:
1. The definition of "property, affairs or government" must be defined on
a "case by case basis."
2. The altering of ward boundaries is within the scope of "property,
affairs or government."
3. The restriction upon City legislation contained in the second sentence
of the quoted constitutional provision is applicable "whether or not" the
legislation relates to "property, affairs or government."
4. The limitation upon the power of the City to act with relation to
Supervisors is not a total restriction to act with regard to them, but only a
limitation in the specific areas set forth. (This conclusion is implicit in the
Court's decision although not explicitly stated in the opinion.)
5. The change of ward boundaries was not within the scope of the term
"mode of selection."
A proper appraisal of the issues involved in this litigation necessitates a
review of the constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with Supervisors.
Constitutional Provisions Regarding Election of Supervisors
Art. IX of the Constitution makes it abundantly clear that the County
Board of Supervisors occupies a key role in the structure of local government.
The opening sentence of that article mandates that "there shall be in each
county outside the city of New York a board of supervisors or other elective
governing body." And the sentence concludes with an equally sweeping
mandate to the legislature to determine its composition: "to be composed
of such members and elected in such manner and for such period as is or may
be provided by law." Nowhere in the Constitution is this broad grant of
legislative power curtailed by any specific restriction relevant to the issue
at hand: the number, and the mode of selection, of supervisors. Successive
enlargements of county home rule powers in Section 2, most recently amended
in 1958, do not modify significantly this fundamental pattern; they merely
assure more local participation in changes. Thus, once a county has adopted an
alternative form of government, any legislative enactment, not applicable to
all counties, which changes the "form or composition" of the county's elective
governing body becomes subject to a county referendum. This is not the appropriate place to detail the intricacies of the relationship between legislative
power and local power over county government. It is important to observe
that the Board of Supervisors or similar body remains the principle depository
of county powers and that there are no provisions in the Constitution which
control the composition of the membership of that body. Changes in "form or
composition" by state legislative enactment are in fact, as has just been noted,
contemplated by the new county home rule provisions.
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Statutory Pattern For Town Supervisors
When one turns to the statutory provisions regarding the Board of
Supervisors, one finds a complete structure insofar as town supervisors are
concerned, but very little insofar as city supervisors are concerned. Sec. 150 of
the County Law, in language which has changed little in more than 150 years,16
provides that: "the supervisors of the several cities and towns in each county,
when lawfully convened, shall constitute the Board of Supervisors of the
county." Sec. 200 authorizes the Board of Supervisors to fix the compensation
of its members "for services rendered to the county." Most of the remaining
provisions of the County Law dealing with the Board of Supervisors are
concerned with its powers and the manner of their exercise. Sec. 411 prohibits
any "elective county officer" from holding "any other elective county or town
office, or that of city supervisor," with an exception not relevant here. This
implies that a town supervisor is not an "elective county officer," since one
serves as a member of the county board of supervisors by virtue of his holding
office as town supervisor. The dual function is further explicitly recognized
by Sec. 153(7) which provides that absence from meetings of the board of
supervisors is excused, among other reasons, if occasioned "by attendance at
a meeting of the town board of a town."
These indicia of the role of the supervisors from the towns are supplemented by various provisions of the Town Law. Sec. 20 provides that every
town shall have an elective supervisor. In addition to numerous duties on
behalf of the town, Sec. 29 imposes upon each town supervisor the duty of
attending the meetings of the board of supervisors of the county. Sec. 41
provides that there shall be one additional supervisor in any town having a
population of more than one-half the total population of the county. Each
of the supervisors from such a town is a member of the board of supervisors,
and "shall have powers and duties coordinate with the powers and duties of
the supervisors of other towns in the county." There follows a paragraph
providing for the equal division of votes between such supervisors "if the
supervisor from such a town be entitled to more than one vote."' 17 Here we
have a complete pattern for the selection of a town official, and for vesting
in him power to act on behalf of the county as a member of its board of
supervisors, not as an elective or appointive county official, but by force of
his position as town officer.
Statutory References to City Supervisors
No similar pattern emerges from the general statutes with respect to
"supervisors of the several cities" who are, along with the
town supervisors,
16. N.Y. Rav. STAT. 1829, Vol. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 1: "The supervisors of the several
cities and towns in each of the counties of this state . . .shall meet annually.. . 2 Vsz€
NEss & WOODWORTH, LAws 1813, Vol. 2, Chap. XLIX, p. 137.
17. No provision authorizing multiple voting by supervisors from the towns has
been found by the authors.
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declared to be a part of the county board of supervisors.18 Art. IX of the
Constitution is silent on the subject of city supervisors except for two limited
references. Sec. 12 excludes "members of the governing elective body of the
county" from the "offices and employees" with respect to whom the cities are
given a broad grant of power. The meaning of this limitation will be discussed
later in detail. Sec. 15, dealing with the time for the election of "city officers,"
specifically adds "including supervisors."
Nor are the general laws relating to cities much more helpful. Sec. 2 of
the General City Law reads as follows: "the term of office of each supervisor
hereafter elected in a city shall, notwithstanding the provisions of such city
charter, be two years, and a supervisor shall only be elected in such city
each second year thereafter, except to fill vacancies." 19 This is the whole of
its reference to city supervisors.
The City Home Rule Law is similarly silent about the supervisors,
except for clauses of limitation which the constitutional limitation quoted above
made necessary.20
The Second Class Cities Law,2 ' which still applies to some cities although
it was a product of the constitutional classification of cities abandoned in
1923, was intended to provide a complete charter for cities in this class and
deals more fully with supervisors. Sec. 10 defines "city officers" to include
"all persons who are elected or appointed to any office of the city created or
authorized by this chapter or otherwise by law." Sec. 11 provides for the
election of stated officers, including the mayor, "by the qualified electors of
the city," and continues: "there shall be elected by the qualified electors of
each ward of the city an alderman and a supervisor." Sec. 13, fixing terms
of office, provides that that of supervisor shall be two years. Sec. 14 specifies
the time for the election of "city officers including supervisors." Sec. 15,
Vacancies, again refers to "an elective office of the city, including that of
supervisor." Sec. 16, after fixing the salaries of the mayor and some additional
named officers, adds: "supervisors shall receive such salary or compensation
as shall be otherwise provided by law." Even in the comparatively detailed
regulation of the Second Class Cities Law, however, there is no other reference
to the number of supervisors than the one arising by implication from the
fact of there being one elected from each ward. It was apparently assumed
that the wards, like the towns, would be otherwise provided for. But they
are not provided for by general law as the towns are.
Similarly, the Optional City Government Law,2 2 which offered to existing
cities a variety of organizational forms, took the ward structure as given and
left supervisors untouched.
Other references to city supervisors in various of the consolidated laws
18.
19.

N.Y. CouxTr LAW § 150.
Adopted N.Y. SESS. LAws 1893 ch. 344.

20.
21.

N.Y. QTY Homm RuLn LAW §§ 11(1), 21(4).
N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1909 ch. 55.

22.

N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1914 ch. 444; amended N.Y. SEss. LAws 1935 ch. 408.

6

SCOPE OF CITY HOME RULE IN NEW YORK
confer particular duties and responsibilities upon them. Thus, Art. XVI of the
Judiciary Law, as recently amended, 23 gives city supervisors some responsibility
in the selection of jury lists in certain counties. Sections 30, 175, and 299 of
the Tax Law imposed certain responsibilities in connection with the collection
of taxes on city supervisors. Most but not all of these obligations are eliminated
under the Real Property Tax Law. 24 New provisions in the Public Health
Law, 25 in connection with consolidated health districts, make provision for
membership of the supervisors of the cities on the boards of health. These
isolated references to the supervisors, and the occasional assignment of
miscellaneous duties to them, merely emphasize the lack of any general provision for their original creation.
Control of City Supervisors by Special Laws
All of this-the lack of reference to the establishment of wards in the
Second Class Cities Law and Optional City Government Law, and the almost
total absence of reference to supervisors in the more general laws relating to
cities-suggests a well established practice of providing for the city supervisors
in some other way. That way, of course, was the legislative charter, which has
always been, in New York, the sole method of creating cities. The General
City Law, by implication, the Second Class Cities Law by express provision,2 6
and the City Home Rule Law by implication, assume the existence of cities:
all three laws define and expand the powers of existing cities; none of them
provides for the creation of cities, as Article II of the Village Law provides
for the incorporation of villages. Every city of the State owes its original
incorporation as a city to a special act of the legislature. In the usual course,
the chartering act would make provision for the election of supervisors and
fix the area from which they were to be elected.
The fundamental nature of this procedure is dramatically illustrated by
the treatment at the hands of the Court of Appeals of a constitutional provision prohibiting the legislature from passing "a private or local bill" "providing
for election of members of boards of supervisors.12 7 The city of Yonkers had
had one supervisor elected at large. The legislature amended the charter of
Yonkers to provide for one supervisor from each of four wards 28 In a contest
over the right to a place on the county board of supervisors from Yonkers, the
Court was asked to hold that the legislative action was a local bill providing
for the election of members of the board of supervisors. So it certainly appears
to be. But the Court held that the prohibition did not relate to city supervisors
"at all, because of the manner in which they come into existence." 29 The Court
N.Y. SEss. LAws 1955 ch. 864 § 502.
N.Y. Sass. LAws 1958 ch. 959.
25. N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1953 ch. 879 §§ 390, 391.
23.

24.

26. Section 4: "application only to a city".

27.
28.
29.
34 N.E.

Art. III § 17; formerly § 18.
N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1892 ch. 54 § 4.
People ex rel. Clancy v. Westchester County Supervisors, 139 N.Y. 524, 529,
1106, 1107 (1893).
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pointed out that cities "have never been created by general laws and cannot
easily or providently be organized in any other method than by special and
local enactments." And it referred to the fact that when the Constitution was
amended in 1874 to prohibit special laws "incorporating villages" no similar
prohibition was imposed with regard to cities.
The history of Buffalo's charter provisions regarding supervisors illustrates
the general practice. Curiously, the original charter of the city80 contained
no reference at all to supervisors. But the oversight, as it seems to have
been, was rectified in the revision of 1839, which provided for their election
-by wards,31 and conferred upon the supervisors the duties of town supervisors.
Subsequent amendments to and revisions of the Buffalo Charter by the legislature have gradually increased the number of wards and supervisors. The
revision of 185432 provided for 13 wards with one supervisor from each.
The revision of 187233 provided for two supervisors from 12 of the 13 wards,
and only one from the thirteenth. The revision of 189234 divided the city into
25 wards, with one supervisor from each. The revision of 19163r increased
the number of wards to 27, still providing one supervisor from each ward.
Throughout the decades, the old provision was continued, giving the supervisors
the same powers as the supervisors of the towns of Erie County, as the Second
Class Cities Law has done since its enactment in 1898. The 1916 charter also
conferred upon supervisors the powers of town fence viewers within their
respective wards. 36 The fence viewing responsibility was dropped with the
adoption by Buffalo of its first home rule charter in 1 9 2 7 ,37 but the 27 wards
were retained, as well as the imposition upon the supervisors of the duties of
town supervisors. An amendment of 1945 added a limiting provision: except
as provided "otherwise" in the Local Finance Law. The Local Finance Law
had been adopted in 1942,38 and imposed substantial obligations upon the
"chief fiscal officer" of each type of municipality. In the case of towns, the
chief fiscal officer is the supervisor; in the case of cities, the comptroller.
This is apparently a decisive point at which the Local Finance Law strips the
city supervisor of most of the powers of a town supervisor. Just how the
earlier duties of town supervisors, many of them fiscal in nature, had been
handled by city supervisors over the decades is not clear.
The Impact of the 1932 Home Rule Amendment
Buffalo's Home Rule Charter, involving a complete rewriting of the document and a substantial change in the structure of the government, was drafted
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1832
N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1839
N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1353
N.Y. Sass. LAws 1870
N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1891
N.Y. SEss. LAws 1914
Id. at § 345.
BuFr~o, N.Y., LAws
N.Y. SEss. LAws 1942

ch. 179.
ch. 24 §§ 9, 14.
ch. 230.
ch. 519.
ch. 105.
ch. 217.
1927, No. 4.
ch. 242.
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by a citizen commission and adopted by referendum. All this was done pursuant
to powers granted to cities by the City Home Rule Law of 1924, which implemented the constitutional command in the home rule amendment of 1923.
The change wrought by the 1923 amendment, despite all the disappointment
which its judicial interpretation has caused to many home rule advocates,
must not be underestimated. Since 1846 the legislature had merely been under
a general constitutional duty to provide for the organization of cities. This
duty it had consistently discharged, as we have seen, by enacting charters in
the form of special laws. With the amendment of 1894, pressure was placed
on the legislature to act with respect to cities by general laws; if the laws were
not general, the city affected was able to exercise a suspensive veto which
necessitated further legislative consideration, but did not otherwise curtail
the legislative power. 9
As we have seen, the Second Class Cities Law, enacted in 1898, served
as a general charter for all cities in the class of 50,000 to 250,000 population,
regulating their organizational structure and the powers and duties of their
officers. Nevertheless, the power of a city over its internal structure and
organization remained small. In 1913, with the enactment of Sections 19 and
20 of the General City Law, the power of cities generally was stated in fairly
broad terms. Sec. 19 gave to "every city" "power to regulate, manage and
control its property and local affairs," and Sec. 20 supported this general grant
by a long list of enumerated powers. Many of these specific grants related
to projects and activities of an external character which might be undertaken;
few related to strictly internal affairs of the city government. Paragraph 17,
conspicuous by its difference from most of the other sections in this regard,
did grant to every city the power "to determine and regulate the number,
mode of selection, terms of employment and qualifications, powers, duties and
compensation of all employees of the city and the relation of all officers and
employees of the city to each other, to the city and to the inhabitants."
Conspicuously missing here is any grant of power to deal in a fundamental
way with officers of the city. And, of course, without such power local control
over the organization and structure of local government is seriously limited.
The Optional City Government Law of 1914 did offer cities a choice among
a wide variety of legislatively prescribed forms, but offered the cities no power
of improvisation in the structure of their government.
What the 1923 Home Rule Amendment did of greatest significance, then,
was to confer upon all cities the power to adopt and amend local laws affecting their officers as well as their employees. This was the turning point in city
control over its cwn governmental form and structure. At the same time,
the freedom of the legislature to act with respect to the affairs of particular
cities was circumscribed by a new formula. Instead of the suspensive veto on
such legislation, the legislature was now altogether precluded from passing it
39.

N.Y. CoNsT. art. XII, § 2 o(1894).
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except upon emergency message of the governor and a 3 vote of both houses.
This grant of power to the cities over their internal arrangements, and the
accompanying restriction on the legislative power to pass special laws about
the government of cities, raises two parallel questions: Did the enlarged power
of the cities over officers extend to supervisors? Was the legislature restricted
in its previously well established power to deal by special law, city by city,
with the numbers and basis of election of supervisors?
1. Whether the 1923 Home Rule Amendment gave the cities power to change
ward boundaries.
After the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment of 1923, the first clause
of Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution read:
Every city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the state relating to
the powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of selection and removal, terms of office and compensation of all officers and employees
of the city....
This is comprehensive language indeed. The enumeration of matters respecting
officers and employees over which control is granted is just as exhaustive as
one could devise. Certainly strong evidence of a restrictive intention would
be necessary to overcome the apparent purpose to grant complete power to
the cities over all aspects of the selection, responsibilities, and removal of
all city officers. Apparently the language was derived from Sec. 20, Par. 17
of the General City Law, enacted in 1913, which gave power to cities to
regulate "the number, mode of selection, terms of employment and qualifications, powers, duties and compensation of all employees of the city." All of
the terms of the General City Law provision were incorporated in the constitutional provision except "terms of employment," which was not apt for
reference to officers, and which was replaced by the equivalent "mode of .. .
removal," "terms of office," and "compensation." In this setting the enumeration must be read, not as a limited grant of carefully selected areas of
control, but as a comprehensive grant of power over city officers. Certainly
this is no situation for the invocation of the frequently abused cannon of
40
statutory construction unius expressio, alterius exclusio.
The full scope of the home rule powers authorized for the cities by the
1923 constitutional amendment was not made available immediately to the
cities, since the City Home Rule Law of 1924 conferred the enumerated powers
only "in relation to" the property, affairs or government of cities. This was
corrected in 1928, however, so that whatever power existea over city officers
independently of power over property, affairs or government has been available
for more than 30 years. That the scope of the power was considered by the
legislature to be sweeping is shown by the kind of local laws for which the
40.

See LENNoFr, ComxsNS, CAsEs AND MATEAlvs oN LzaIsLAON (1949) Ch.

10

XIX.
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statute required a referendum: 41 one which abolishes an elective office, or
changes the method of removing an elective officer, or changes the term of or
reduces the salary of an elective officer during his term of office (Par. 4);
"abolishes, transfers or curtails any power of an elective city officer" (Par. 5);
or "creates a new elective office" (Par. 6).
This may seem to belabor the point unduly, but consideration of the
problem at hand necessitates a clear understanding that the scope of city
power over "all officers .. .of the city" is complete. Certainly it is broad
enough to include chahges in the areas from which officers are elected.
And this brings us to the next important issue: whether supervisors
elected from the city are "officers . . .of the city." That the supervisors are
county officers is indisputably clear; they perform many important legislative
and administrative functions on behalf of the county. But there is no logical
barrier to the same officer being an officer of two units of government. And
the attempt to classify supervisors elected from a city as exclusively county
or exclusively city officers has resulted in nothing but confusion. The Court
of Appeals was clearly correct in the present case when it asserted: "it must
be conceded that, for some purposes, a member of a county board of supervisors elected from a city is a city officer."42 The cases cited by the Court so
hold, and the statutory pattern of responsibility, both under the Town Law
for town supervisors and under 150 years of legislative charters as well as
provisions of general law for city supervisors, makes clear their dual role.
The constitutional grant does not exclude officers of the city who are also
officers of the county. It is hard to find justification for judicial creation of
such a limitation, especially in view of the fact that the adoption of the 1938
constitutional limitation reflects a conviction that the 1923 grant of city
power did extend to supervisors as to other officers. Furthermore, it should
be noted that Section 21 the City Home Rule Law, adopted in 1924 to implement the constitutional amendment of 1923, expressly denied authority to
enact any local law which superseded a state statute if it: "(4) changes the
number or term of office of the members of the county board of supervisors
chosen as such in such city under the official title of supervisors." This
arguably implies legislative recognition of city home rule power to enact local
laws which in some way affected city supervisors. It seems, then, that in
view of the comprehensive character of the grant of power over city officers,
and the fact that supervisors are city officers for some purposes, whatever else
they may be, the cities did have power to change ward boundaries as an incidental aspect of their sweeping control over city officers.
It is perfectly clear that the cities proceeded promptly to assert their
power by exercising it. In 1925 the city of Newburgh adopted a local law
amending its legislative charter by superseding the special law which had
set up eight wards, and providing instead for nine wards, while retaining the
41.
42.

N.Y.

SEss. LAws 1924 ch. 363 § 15.
Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y. 2d 168, 172, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1959).
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provision of the charter under which a supervisor was elected from each
ward. 43 In 1926, the city of North Tonawanda redrew some of the ward
boundary lines as established in its legislative charter.44 In 1927 Syracuse increased the number of wards from eight to nineteen, without apparently
changing the charter provision providing for the election of one supervisor
from each ward.4 5 These references are far from exhaustive; but they do
indicate the early assumption, widely made, about the applicability to supervisors of the new power over city officers. 46
In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that this practice
"lends great weight" "to the conclusion that such legislation affects only the
property, affairs or government of the municipality involved." That this
practice lends weight to the conclusion that cities had the power to change ward
boundaries is clear. That it has anything to do with the scope of "property,
affairs or government" is much less clear. It is true that for four years (1924
to 1928), the City Home Rule Law gave to the cities power over their
officers only "in relation to" their property, affairs or government. But from
1928 until 1939, the power was exercised by the cities without there being
any necessity to raise the question whether property, affairs or government
was involved at all. And even during the first four years, the clear constitutional grant of power over city officers may have diverted attention from the
possibility that the statute gave the power less broadly than the Constitution
47
did.
2. Whether the 1923 Amendment restricted the legislature's previously
exercised power to deal with city supervisors by special law.
The question whether legislation concerning city supervisors was part
of the property, affairs or government of the cities would have been squarely
raised if the legislature had passed a special law changing the number of
supervisors in a particular city and the law had been challenged. Before
1924, it probably would not have occurred to anyone that the legislature lacked
power to deal as it saw fit with city supervisors by special law. The cities
had no general constitutional power over their own officers, much less those
with county duties. This first came in 1924. No case has been found which
challenged an attempt by the legislature, after 1924, to pass a special law
applicable to only one city, affecting the supervisors. It will be recalled
43. NEWBuRGH, N.Y., LAWS 1925, No. 3.
44. NoRTH TOxAWANDA, N.Y. LAWS 1926, No. 3.
45. SYRACUSE, N.Y., LAWS 1927, No. 1, amending N.Y. Sass. LAWS 1885 ch. 26 § 4;
no change in § 94.
46. It is not clear just how these cities presumed to change the number of their
supervisors in the face of the provisions of Section 21(4) of the City Home Rule Law
supra note 20. Since the Newburgh and Syracuse charters, amended by the local laws
referred to, were legislative charters, the local laws seem clearly to have superseded state
law in increasing the number of supervisors.
47. In view of the last sentence of Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution as
amended in 1923, directing the legislature at its next session to "provide by general law
for carrying into effect the provisions of this section", we assume that the constitutional
grant of power to the cities was not self-operative.
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that a law involving the property, affairs or government of a city, and special
in its terms or effect, could be passed under Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1923
Home Rule Amendment only upon emergency message and a /3 vote of
each house of the state legislature, and, since 1938, only upon request of the
municipality. If, as the Court of Appeals declares in the present case, legislation affecting city supervisors "affects only the property, affairs or government" of the municipality involved, then it would probably follow that the
legislature could not deal with the problem by ordinary law.
The conclusion can be only probable, since the law of New York has not
been altogether clear as to whether or not a given matter held to be property,
affairs or government insofar as authorization for city power is concerned is
necessarily property, affairs or government insofar as restraint upon state
power is concerned. Certainly the various opinions in the foundational case of
Adler v. Degan4O leave the issue in some confusion. Two of the prevailing
opinions in Adler, Judge Crane's and Judge Pound's, sound as if the existence
of substantial state concern in a matter apparently the property, affairs or
government of a city prevents the matter from being so categorized under
the Constitution, insofar as restraint on state legislative action is concerned.
And it would seem to be helpful to coherent thought that things which are
not property, affairs or government when legislative restraints are considered
should also not be property, affairs or government when city power is concerned. But Judge Cardozo's opinion in Adler suggests that some matters
may be both of sufficient local concern, to justify local regulation, and also
of sufficient state concern not to preclude special state legislation. However,
it must be remembered that when Adler was decided there was no affirmative
grant of powers to the cities in terms of property, affairs or government to be
weighed, and the specific grants of legislative power to the cities under the
General City Law quite clearly encompassed regulation of tenement houses,
the subject matter of the litigation.
How would the Court of Appeals deal today with an attempt by the
legislature to do what it had been doing ever since the State was createdthat is, fix, for a particular city, the number of city supervisors, and delimit
the districts from which they are to be chosen? The opinion of the Court of
Appeals in the present case points to the legislature's "allotting representation"
on the board of supervisors. While these references are made in order to
indicate that the legislature recognized city supervisors as city officers, they
suggest emphatically the considerable state concern about city supervisors
arising from their crucial role in county government. If cities before 1938 had
gone on a frolic4 9 and increased the numbers of their supervisors in order
to dominate the county boards, it is doubtful that the Court would have
held the legislature to be precluded from intervening by cutting down the
48. 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929).
49. Despite the restriction in Sec. 21(4) of the City Home Rule Law, see footnote
46, supra.
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number of city supervisors. Such a result could easily have been reached
before 1938, since it would have been possible to hold, following Adler,
that state concern in the allocation of power between towns and cities, an
important feature of county government, was strong enough to take city
representation on the board of supervisors out of the negative category of
property, affairs or government. Now, of course, the problem is affected by
the restriction on city dealing with supervisors which, as we shall see, was
introduced in the 1938 convention in order to forestall the kind of eventuality
just suggested. The present problems are complex enough to warrant our avoiding speculation about moot ones. Yet the whole background of city home rule
in New York, the persistent struggle of the courts to keep the door open for
legislative intervention when significant state interests were at stake, suggests
strongly that the Court would not have treated property, affairs or government as covering city supervisors and thus preventing continued exercise of
the traditional legislative power over them. While the Court's opinion in the
present case rightly emphasizes the case-by-case development of the meaning
of property, affairs or government, it points to no cases which support the
conclusion that this kind of action by the legislature would have been barred
prior to 1938 as involving the property, affairs or government of cities.
Thus it would seem that before the present decision, if the Legislature
had acted with respect to ward boundaries so as to affect the nomination and
election of supervisors to serve on the county board of supervisors, the Court
would not have held such action barred as being within the restrictions imposed
upon legislation dealing with "property, affairs or government" of a city.
Nevertheless, the Court in the present case held that the alteration of ward
boundaries was an affair of the city. The Court went further, and plainly
stated that the alteration of ward boundaries was exclusively an affair of
the municipality; that is, that the State Legislature could not alter them by
law. Presumably the Court took this further step because it felt that under
the prior treatment of "property, affairs or government" its negative effect had
to be co-extensive with its affirmative effect. The novel aspect of this holding
is that, in the face of a clear state interest, the Court accepted the local interest
as controlling, whereas in the general course of decisions interpreting "property,
affairs or government" the converse attitude had previously prevailedY0 This
conclusion, however, we do not believe to be decisive of the instant litigation
because, as we shall explain, the restrictions resulting from the 1938 Constitutional Amendments applied whether or not the local legislation related
to "property, affairs or government" of cities.
50. From Adler v. Degan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929) to Salzman v. Impelleteri, 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953) the Court has consistently held that a
substantial state concern overrode even urgent local concern when "property, affairs or
government" was being interpreted. That there is a substantial state concern in the
practical political control over the composition of county boards of supervisors seems
quite clear.
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The Impact of the 1938 Constitutional Amendments
1. Whether the redrawing of ward boundaries is within city power over its
property, affairs or government.
The previous discussion approached this question in terms of its negative
impact upon state legislative power, a problem which existed before 1938.
With the 1938 amendment, cities were given a new grant of power framed
in the same language that had previously been used only to define limitations
on the legislative power to intervene in city affairs by special law.
Looking at the question just from the affirmative side, it would appear
that whether or not power over city supervisors was part of the property,
affairs or government of a city would depend upon the role of city supervisors.
They might, on the one hand, be regarded primarily as representatives to the
county governing board of the citizens of the ward from which they are
elected. In this manner all citizens of the county would have some direct
representation of their interests with respect to county affairs.
They might, on the other hand, be regarded primarily as representatives
of the city on the county governing body. As city representatives, they
would properly be subject to the fullest measure of city control. So to treat
them is certainly consistent with the traditional treatment of town supervisors;
these are elected as town officers and they sit on the county governing board
strictly by virtue of their being officers of the town. It is to this latter responsibility primarily that they are elected by the citizens of the town. Insofar
as supervisors might perform other functions on behalf of the city as a wholeand we have seen that despite the obsolescence of their functions within the
city as supervisors, they still may have specifically delegated city functionstheir role as city officer, rather than direct citizen representative, is emphasized. There would appear to be enough in this overall pattern to support the
Court's conclusion in the present case that the legislature "was allotting
board of supervisors representation to local communities of government as well
as to citizens generally." 51 And even if this is not the whole role of city
supervisors, it is arguably an important enough one to make control of their
selection a part of the city's affairs. We have already discussed the fact
that in accepting this ordinary meaning of the term, the Court appears to
have departed from the previous practice of finding matters not to be city
affairs if they are also of substantial state concern.
2. The scope of the 1938 limitation.
The constitutional convention of 1938 did two important things to the
City Home Rule article of the Constitution (Formerly Sec. 3 of Art. XII,
now Sec. 12 of Art. IX). It added an affirmative power over property, affairs
or government, and it inserted a limitation on the power over "members of
the governing elective body of the county in which such city is wholly con51. Note 42 supra.
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tained". The changes can best be grasped if they are set out with the old
provisions, italics indicating the additions and brackets the deletions:
Art. IX, Sec. 12:
Every city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws
not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the state relating
to its property, affairs or government. Every city shall also have the
power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with this
constitution and laws of the state, and whether or not such local
laws relate to its property, affairs or government, in respect [relating] to the following subjects: the powers, duties, qualifications,
number, mode of selection and removal, terms of office and compensation of all its officers and employees [of the city] except of
members of the governing elective body of the county in which such
city is wholly contained ....
The first question that presents itself in our present context is whether
the exception in the second sentence applies at all to the power granted in
the first sentence. The first sentence gives power over property, affairs or government; the second sentence gives power over enumerated matters
"whether or not" they relate to property, affairs or government, with a stated
exception. Does the exception apply to matters which are within the city's
property, affairs or government? The "whether or not" clause seems to mean
that the enumerated powers may overlap property, affairs or government
powers. And the complete enumeration obviously includes matters which on
any interpretation would be part of property, affairs or government; as, for
example, the transaction of its business, the care and management of its streets
and property. Hence, while the enumerated powers may include powers not
part of property, affairs or government, they also must have been understood
as including powers which were part of property, affairs or government.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the enumerated powers had
previously been granted, and the apparent intention was not to exclude any
of them merely because there was a new, very general grant of power. It
would seem to follow from this that the limitation is applicable to the stated
powers irrespective of whether a particular stated power is also a part of the
general power.
It might be suggested that the limitation applies to the enumerated
powers only insofar as they go beyond the grant of general power; that is,
that the limitation applies only to those of the listed elements of control
over officers which are not included within the city's property, affairs or
government. But there does not appear to be any reasonable basis for such
a reading of the exception. As previously pointed out, the specific powers
clause is framed as a unit, as a comprehensive grant of power over city
offices; no one of the items is less or more a part of the cities' property,
affairs or government than any other. We conclude, then, that, as the Court
held here, the limitation regarding supervisors is applicable to the city's power
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over its officers, whether or not that power is part of its property, affairs or
government, or stems wholly from the specific grant.
If we are correct in our analysis thus far, the crucial constitutional
question is this case is the scope of the 1938 amendment restricting the power
previously granted to cities over their officers and employees. The restriction,
we believe, applies equally whether the power over officers is looked for in the
1938 grant of authority over property, affairs or government, or in the 1923
grant of authority over enumerated matters including officers and employees.
The Court of Appeals so held in the present case, but concluded further that
the limitation did not reach the action taken here. It arrived at this conclusion by reading the phrase "mode of selection" in isolation, as if it were
a single term specifically written into the limitation, and holding that it did
not apply to a change in ward boundaries. But the limitation is not framed
in that way. It is a single limitation applicable to a grant of powers, which,
as we have previously shown, was intended to be complete except as to matters
controlled by the Constitution or state law. The most obvious meaning of
the exception is to withdraw, with respect to supervisors, the full range of
power granted generally over city officers.
This possibility the Court did not consider at all in its opinion. The
question that naturally arises is whether the limitation can fairly be read
in any other way. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look
at the history of the 1938 amendments, in the light of the. previous adoption
of the grant in 1923. How, then, did the 1938 limitation come into being?
Part of the immediate background of the adoption of the limitation was
the Clancy case, already referred to.m That case, it will be recalled, held that
the constitutional prohibition against the passage by the legislature of private
or local bills "providing for election of members of boards of supervisors"
did not apply to legislative action with respect to city supervisors. The
Court found that the lack of feasibility of governing cities by uniform law,
as the towns were governed, had reinforced the long established practice of
dealing with the incorporation of cities solely by special law, and as a necessary
incident to this, providing for the number of supervisors to be elected from the
city. Summarizing its opinion, the Court said "cities all over the state have
been supplied with supervisors by the local law of their charters . . .,,.53
With cities given the power by the 1923 home rule amendment to make
their own charters, it was naturally felt that a part of this power would be
the power to provide for their own supervisors, and, as we have seen, such
power was in fact promptly exercised. Stimulated by the implications of this
case, 54 the following discussion appears during the proceedings of the 1938
52. 139 N.Y. 524, 34 N.E. 1106 (1893).
53. Id. at 530, 1107.

54. A question naturally arises as to why Mr. Wallin was so concerned about the
cities' changing the number of their supervisors in view of the fact that Section 21(4)
of the City Home Rule Law had apparently prohibited this since 1924. Several answers
suggest themselves. First, as noted above, the statutory limitation had apparently been
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constitutional convention.55
"Mr. Wallin: Mr. Chairman.
"The Chairman: The Chair recognizes Mr. Wallin.
"Mr. Wallin: I would like to call Mr. Riegelman's attention
to the provision on page 3, line 13, where the city is given complete
authority to provide for the powers, duties, qualifications, number,
mode of selection and removal, terms of office, and compensation
of all its officers.
"Now, a supervisor, as I understand it, is a city officer, and
he sits in the board of supervisors. Since 1894, it has been the practice for the charters of cities to provide for the number of supervisors
to be elected. In Westchester, very recently, we have had this
experience: A village, namely Peekskill, by referendum, has adopted
a city charter. Formerly a part of the town of Cortlandt, the village
and town, of course, the town had one representative, in the board
of supervisors. By the simple expedient of adopting a city charter
that town has increased its representation in our county board of
supervisors from one to four. Under the words of this proposal,
I think that supervisors should be exempted from this power of
cities to name the number of officers they are going to have represent
them in our board of supervisors.
"Mr. Riegelman: Mr. Chairman, the language that was read
by Mr. Wallin is identical with the language which is at present in
Article XII of the Constitution. We have not made any change, but
I think we have helped the situation described by Mr. Wallin by the
insertion of the language on page 5, line 10, which makes the whole
act inapplicable to the counties not wholly contained within a city.
In other words, if the situation has been affected at all, it has been
improved along the lines that you have in mind.
"Mr. Wallin: Still it does not seem to me that cures it. It
seems to me you ought to take out of the Constitution a provision
whereby the city by a vote of the city can increase its representation
on the county board of supervisors.
"Mr. Riegelman: I haven't the slightest doubt in the world,
Mr. Wallin, that under the home rule amendment as it is at present
and under the proposal a city may not increase its representation
on the county board of supervisors. And if there is any doubt about
it, the new language in line 10, page 5, would remove that doubt.
"Mr. Wallin: How will a city provide for representation on a
board of supervisors under your provision?
overlooked or disregarded in the enthusiastic exercise of the new constitutional home rule
powers. Secondly, that statutory limitation ran only against local laws which superseded
state enactments. There may well have been cause for concern as to how long a legislative charter retained its character as state law after the substance of its provisions had
been incorporated into a comprehensive home rule charter. Finally, Mr. Wallin may
simply have been moved by a general uneasiness about leaving the limitation in the
hands of the legislature: he wanted a limitation beyond legislative power to remove or
weaken it.
55. NEW YoRx STATE CoNsT=TnowAL CoNEvNiox, 1938, RxcoRD, v.3, pp. 18401841; 1843-1845.
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"Mr. Riegelman: That I would say is entirely a county matter.
"Mr. Wallin: It has not been up to this time.
"Mr. Riegelman: And would have to be regulated either by a
county law or by a State law. But, I do not see how the city gets
any power under the present Constitution or under this proposal.
"Mr. Wallin: Well, to this time cities in their charters provide
for the number of supervisors to be elected in the city. They sit in
the boards of supervisors. And that is left to the Legislature. There
is no great harm in that because the rest of the county is presumably
represented in the Legislature and office of the Governor. But under
your act, as I see it, cities are left in complete control. I do not
understand how line 10, page 5, cures it.
"I would like to propose an amendment in any event, because
I am very doubtful about it. And if there be no change, then I say
there should be a change in the law."
"The Chairman: Mr. Wallin presents the following amendment.
"The Secretary: Proposed amendment to amend General Order
No. 21, Pr. No. 823, Int. No. 659, page 3, line 14, after the word
'employees' add in italics, 'except supervisors.'
"Mr. Riegelman: May I ask Mr. Moore his judgment of the
effect of that suggested amendment?
"Mr. F. C. Moore: Mr. Chairman, I frankly do not know the
answer to that question. I have been trying to puzzle it out.
"Mr. Riegelman: Perhaps Mr. Dowsey has an opinion on that,
as chairman of the Committee on Counties. Frankly, I should like
to be advised by the gentlemen who know most about county government, Mr. Dowsey and Mr. Moore, on the acceptability of that
suggested amendment.
"Mr. Dowsey: I do not know the answer yet.
"Mr. Riegelman: Mr. Chairman, I do not see any objection
to Mr. Wallin's addition, but it may be that some of my friends
from upstate, some of the gentlemen from upstate, or some of
the ladies from upstate, may know of some reason why it should
not be accepted. Subject to that, I have no objection to it.
"The Chairman: The Chair would state further, Mr. Riegelman, there are some services performed by city supervisors that
would be paid by the city, but in general, on the administrative
part, they are paid by the county.
"Mr. Riegelman: May we have that amendment read again?
"The Secretary: Page 3, line 14, after the word 'employees' add
in italics 'except supervisors.'
"Mr. Riegelman: Then, Mr. Chairman, as I understand it,
Mr. Wallin withdraws the amendment for the moment with the
understanding-
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"Mr. Wallin: No, I do not withdraw it, but I will later on,
if that is not satisfactory.
"Mr. Riegelman: Very good."
The issue was thus raised, and its relationship to the implication of the Clancy
case is quite clear. Mr. Wallin was obviously attempting to formulate an
amendment to allay his fears that under the Clancy case cities could, by
exercise of their home rule powers, increase at will the number of supervisors
representing them on the county board. Final action came after further
consideration of the language felt to be appropriate: 6
"The Chairman: We are voting upon the amendment on pages
2, 3, 4, and 5 of the proposal. The vote on the amendment will be in
reverse order. The first amendment is the amendment offered by
Mr. Wallin. The Clerk will read.
"Mr. Wallin: Mr. Chairman, may I change the language, after
consultation with gentlemen representing counties?
"The Chairman: Send it up, Mr. Wallin.
"The Secretary: By Mr. Wallin. Page 3, line 14, after the
word 'employees' add in italics 'except of members of the governing
elective body of the county in which such city is wholly contained.'
"Mr. Riegelman: With respect to that amendment, I withdraw
my request for a rising vote.
"The Chairman: All those in favor of the adoption of the
amendment will signify by saying Aye; opposed, No. The amendment is adopted."
The history here suggests that, in order to prevent city manipulation of
the number of supervisors and thereby control of the boards, supervisors were
withdrawn altogether from the scope of the whole range of power given to
cities with respect to their officers and employees generally. This entire grant
was taken away, insofar as supervisors were concerned, because of their role
in county government. Thus, the history of the adoption of the amendment
can be read in a manner consistent with the apparent meaning of the
language. This is more than a defensible interpretation; it is a highly persuasive one, and, in the opinion of one of the authors, should have been decisive
of the case.
There is, however, an important consideration in connection with this
reading which, in the opinion of the other author, fully supports the Court
in reaching a contrary result; that is, in holding that the 1938 limitation did
not strip cities of all power to affect in any way those who serve as supervisors. 5 7 The history of the exception in the 1938 convention clearly shows
56. Id. at 1851.
57. The Court did not in its opinion mention the contention of the plaintiff-respondent
that the 1938 limitation eliminated all city power over supervisors. The limitation is dealt
with by examining the phrase "mode of selection" in isolation, as if it were an independently
expressed term of limitation, and concluding that, so regarded, it does not cover alteration
of ward boundaries.
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that its sponsor feared, and sought to avoid, the power of cities to control
the number of their supervisors, and thus control the balance of political
power in the county governing body. He indicated no fear or need to limit
otherwise the cities' control over supervisors. The denial of all power concerning supervisors is of more than theoretical significance. Throughout the
years city supervisors have occasionally been given by charter some specific
duties within the city.58 And they have consistently been given, in general
terms, the powers of town supervisors, both by provisions in the legislative
charters and by Section 210 of the Second Class Cities Law. This general
grant of duties to city supervisors of town supervisors has become obsolete
with the passage of the Local Finance Law in 1942. By redefinition of terms,
this placed most of the fiscal responsibilities upon the supervisors in the towns
and upon the comptroller or treasurer in the cities. Notwithstanding this
important change, the tradition of city supervisors having some responsibilities
within the city is a firm part of the pattern of local government in New York.
And, recently there has been considerable discussion about the possibility
of combining the offices of city councilmen and supervisors in order to
consolidate the experience for both offices and in order to permit more
adequate compensation for the public service involved. Other possibilities may
arise for utilizing more fully the governmental experience of the city supervisors as that of the town supervisors has always been utilized.59 It is
suggested, therefore, that there is adequate reason to avoid if possible an
excessively restrictive reading of the 1938 exception.
One way of restricting the interpretation to coincide with the specific
purpose of the sponsor is readily suggested by the language: "except of
members of the governing elective body of the county in which the city is
wholly contained." 60 If this refers to supervisors in their capacity as
supervisors and only in such capacity, would there be a reconciliation of
the factors mentioned above? Of the aspects of control enumerated in the
original grant, about half can be read distributively:-powers, duties, and
compensation can be regulated separately insofar as city activities, if any,
are concerned. Indeed, this is precisely what the laws of the state do with
58. See footnotes 23, 24, and 25, supra.
59. Some reexamination of the statutory laws on dual office holding would be
needed. Section 19 of the Second Class Cities Law, for example, provides that "no
person at the same time shall hold more than one city office". The special role that supervisors play would seem to leave them outside this restriction, in view of the historic imposition of dual responsibilities since the state was organized.
60. A somewhat different, and extremely narrow reading of the constitutional exception, appears to be embodied in the legislative incorporation of the exception in the
City Home Rule Law. Since 1924, that law has carried the grant of power over officers
in the words of the constitution. But the exception added in 1939 underwent a substantial
modification in its journey from constitution to statute. The constitution says: "except
of members of the governing elective body of the county in which such city is wholly
contained". The statute says: "Not including officers who perform no functions for the
city except as members of the governing elective body of a county in which such city
is wholly contained". If the statute controlled, cities would escape the constitutional
limitation altogether simply by giving their supervisors some real functions on behalf
of the city. We question whether the Constitutional limitation can be thus avoided.
21
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respect to town supervisors. On the other hand, qualifications, number, mode
of selection, and removal, would seem to require unitary regulation; that is,
whatever applied to the individual in his capacity as a city officer would seem
necessarily to apply to him in his capacity as county officer. In effect, this
reading would mean that city functions can be given to a person who serves
as city supervisor, and he may receive extra compensation for performing
them, but the mode of selection, qualification, term of office, and number
may not be regulated by the city because they necessarily affect the individuals
in their role as county supervisors. 61 Accordingly it is urged that the exclusion
of power with respect to supervisors is not a total exclusion of power with
respect to them, but only an exclusion of power with respect to their positions
as supervisors in relation to county government. That is, where their positions
as members of the board of supervisors of the county are involved, the city
has no power with regard to them. The exclusion of power, then, is not a
general exclusion with respect to persons who act as supervisors, but an
exclusion of a power with respect to certain aspects of the position of supervisor including their "mode of selection."
If the language of the exception is read in this way, then for purposes of
the present case the meaning of "mode of selection" must be examined, since
the mode of selection of supervisors is beyond the cities' control. Barehotv
v. Rockester62 holds that "mode of selection" involves more than the choice
between election and appointment, and includes "the precise method by which
either an election or an appointment shall be effected."6 3 This certainly seems
to be a fair reading of the grant of authority in its context. But the case
does not hold specifically that changing ward boundaries is part of mode of
selection. That question was not in issue. What was involved was the
choice between election from the city-at-large and election from districts.
Of course it would seem to be unreasonable that an affirmative grant of power
should include all the significant aspects of choice yet exclude only the minor
ones. Hence, it seems most likely that, in the light of the Bareham case,
the constitutional provisions would be construed to authorize the city to
change the boundaries of the districts from which its councilmen were elected.
This result could be reached, without having to read "mode of selection" as
including change of district lines, simply by reading the total grant of power
as including this minor power by implication.
The Bareham case involved the establishment by local law of councilmanic
districts, and the election of a councilman from each. The holding of the
Court of Appeals was that this came within the term "mode of selection."
In the present case, we have changes in previously established ward boundaries.
61. In this connection, there may be some question about the varying provisions in
city charters providing for the method of filling the vacancy when a supervisor is incapable of acting or resigns during his term. Insofar as these provisions derive from
legislative charters, as do the existing ones in the Buffalo charters, no problem arises.
62. 246 N.Y. 140, 158 N.E. 51 (1927).
63. Id. at 146, 53.
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The question involved, as framed by the Court, is thus whether, in the light
of the Bareham case, such changes came within the phrase "mode of selection."
The authors agree that if the charter were amended so that each supervisor were to be elected at large by all of the electors of the city rather than
by the respective voters of each ward, there would be a change in the "mode
of selection." One of the authors contended in the litigation, and still maintains, that a regrouping of electors of wards is likewise a change in the
method of nominating and electing supervisors, the difference being merely
one of degree. He submits that if each supervisor were to be elected by all
the electors of the city, the change would be from the group of electors within
a particular ward to a group of electors resident in the larger area comprising
the city. The change of ward boundaries, he submits, likewise results in a
regrouping of electors and is therefore a change in the "mode of selection" of
supervisors.
The other author, however, agrees with the Court that changes in ward
boundaries do not constitute a change in the "mode of selection." He submits
that election at large and election by districts are generally recognized as two
quite distinct methods or modes of electing officers, and that altering ward
boundaries is merely re-arranging some of the details of a given mode of
selection. He therefore does not agree, as Special Term and the Appellate
Division held, that a change in boundaries is a change in mode of selection.
In connection with the argument advanced by Special Term that if lines could
be redrawn, it would be possible to redraw them in such a way as to put all
of the city except an insignificant part into a single ward, he submits that this
would be tantamount to changing to election at large and would properly
fall as a change in "mode of selection."
If "mode of selection" does not include change of ward boundaries, as
the Court concluded, then the primary issue in the present case must turn on
the meaning to be given to the 1938 limitation upon the cities' powers over
their officers and employees. Two answers to the question thus raised have
been outlined. One would find in the limitation a total withdrawal with
respect to supervisors who perform no functions for the city other than
serving on the county board of supervisors of every aspect of the power given
to cities generally over their officers. The other answer sees a withdrawal
from cities of only those aspects of control which affect supervisors in their
relationship with the county, but does not make such limitation all inclusive
in the light of their being representatives of the city on the county board of
supervisors and the prospect that they may also at times have other functions
for the city. The authors are in agreement that if a basis for the decision of
the Court of Appeals is to be found, it can best be provided in the latter
interpretation. There is room for rational disagreement as to which of the
two interpretations is the more compelling; at least the authors hope so, for
they are in disagreement. They are in agreement that the second interpretation
provides the most satisfactory basis for the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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As previously noted, in numerous cases since, 1923, cities have amended
their charters to change ward boundaries. No judicial challenge ever appears
to have been made, and there is no specific evidence of legislative awareness
of this course of conduct. These circumstances would seem to suggest that the
practice has not been of sufficient importance to settle the interpretation of the
provision in question. Yet it should be remembered that a holding different
from the one reached by the Court of Appeals might have raised questions
about the validity of action taken over the years by boards of supervisors
in counties in which the cities had by their own action changed the boundaries
of the wards from which their supervisors were elected.
If the choice as to the meaning of the 1938 exception is not compelled
by direct precedent, and if it is not dictated by past practice, it would
probably be made on the basis of one's conviction as to how compatible the
alternative results are with one's understanding of the proper scope of city,
county and state power under the history-laden constitutional and statutory
provisions. The official judgement on this issue has been authoritatively pronounced by the Court of Appeals: the established pattern is declared to be
best maintained by a narrow reading of the 1938 limitation upon city power
over its officers. As a practical matter, the decision would appear to give
the cities a little more room for political maneuver in the struggle for party
control of county government, which may be expected to increase in intensity
in the years ahead in the metropolitan areas.
CONCLUSION

By holding generally that supervisors are within the property, affairs
or government of cities, the Court has left open the possibility that the state
legislature may no longer do what it has done for a century and a half: enact,
by ordinary procedures, special laws which fix the basis for election of city
supervisors. We know that the courts are extraordinarily slow to upset
apportionment actions of the qualified legislative body.0 4 It seems, therefore,
that if the Legislature has lost its power to act in special cases, and if
excessive manipulation of city ward boundaries is to be avoided, with new
lines being drawn every time a change of party control occurs in the city, the
legislature will have to adopt general laws setting up meaningful standards
for apportionment. Many would feel that such a result would be desirable.
If effective standards were worked out for the guidance of city legislative
bodies, consideration might also be given to the establishment of similar
standards for the state legislature in its exercise of the same power over state
legislative districts.
The Court in the present case might have held that control over city
64. There is some doubt whether the old doctrine of excessively close scrutiny by
the courts of the reasonableness of city ordinances not passed under specific legislative
authorization is theoretically supportable under constitutional city home rule. The
dismissal in this case of the second cause of action attacking the reasonableness of the local
law indicates that the courts do not intend to apply it, at least in this type of situation.
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supervisors, insofar as they perform county functions, is not part of the
city's property, affairs, and government because of the State's substantial and
legitimate concern in avoiding an excessively unbalanced and unrepresentative
county governing body. This would certainly have been consistent with the
traditional New York development of the property, affairs or government
formula as a limitation upon state legislative authority. The Court may still
arrive at that result, in one of two ways, when confronted by a statute correcting a shockingly bad apportionment in a particular city-county situation.
It may reinterpret the basis of the present decision to place the city's
authority for the action here taken upon the specific grant, rather than
upon property, affairs or government, and read the limitation in a distributive
fashion as it applies to city and county aspects of the supervisor's offices; or
it may repudiate its dictum in the present case and hold forthrightly, as it has
never to our knowledge held, that property, affairs or government as a
limitation upon state legislative power means something quite different from
property, affairs or government as a grant of city power-a result that would
serve only further to obfuscate an area of the law that is already almost
unmanageable for complexity.
The authors are in disagreement about the correctness of the present
decision. One of the authors feels that the constitutional limitation properly
read precludes the action that was taken by the Buffalo City Council and
that the Court should have so held. The other author feels that the result
was correct, and that the limitation can and should be interpreted to permit
that result. Both authors agree, and submit, that if the case is not to have
unfortunate doctrinal consequences it should be understood to hold that the
city's action was authorized, not because city supervisors as such are part
of the city's property, affairs or government, but because city supervisors, being
city officers as well as county officers, fall within the specific constitutional grant
to cities of power over their officers, and because the limitation reaches only
those aspects of control of supervisors which affect their role as county
officers.

